

**Illegal Fishing in the South China Sea: Why a US–Indonesia Partnership on
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Complicates Matters for China**

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14. ABSTRACT: The United States should reinforce its partnership with Indonesia on the issue of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in order to challenge the legitimacy of excessive Chinese claims in the South China Sea (SCS). Indonesia's aggressive stance against IUU fishing could have larger implications in the Indo-Pacific region for the United States. Since excessive claims are a trademark of Beijing's approach to statecraft, reinforcing the United States-Indonesia partnership on illegal fishing could be a way to fight back against China without risking military escalation. In essence, such a partnership would focus on challenging Chinese legitimacy. Simply put, China's approach to statecraft only works if its actions are seemingly legitimate, or at least legitimate enough, under international law. The central idea of this paper is to propose a way to challenge Chinese legitimacy by focusing attention on the illegitimacy of its actions. With regard to IUU fishing, since international law does not recognize China's nine-dash line, fishing without permission by Chinese vessels in its neighbors' EEZs is by definition illegal. This paper makes three main points why a reinforced United States-Indonesia partnership would be an effective way to counter Chinese claims. First, Indonesia is well-postured to be a regional leader against illegal fishing, given its embrace of its maritime identity. Second, Indonesia's aggressive stance against IUU fishing makes it an ideal partner for the United States to counter Chinese claims in the SCS. Third, the United States has a window of opportunity to use IUU fishing as a strategic narrative against China, while Indonesia is on the United Nations Security Council from 2019 to 2020.					
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*“Oceans, seas, straits, and gulfs are the future of our civilization.
We have been showing our backs [to them for] too long...”ⁱ*

- President Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s 7th President

Introduction

At the November 2014 East Asia Summit, newly elected Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared his ambition to transform Indonesia into a maritime power.ⁱⁱ The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) ten member countries and the Presidents of the United States, Japan, and India were all in attendance as President Jokowi unveiled his Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF).ⁱⁱⁱ The vision alluded to the need for the Republic of Indonesia (ROI) to protect its maritime resources by combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Since President Jokowi’s announcement, some reports estimate that Indonesia has reduced IUU fishing by foreign vessels in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by 90%.^{iv} The Jokowi administration’s success in combatting IUU fishing is good news for Indonesia, but it also has broader implications for the Indo-Pacific region.

Finding effective countermeasures to excessive Chinese claims in the South China Sea (SCS) is a problem that continues to vex the United States and its regional allies and partners. The ROI’s crackdown on illegal fishing could provide an opportunity for the United States to counter those claims. The two nations could build on their existing relationship on IUU fishing under the United Nations (UN) Agreement on Port State Measures as a way to counter China without risking military escalation.^v Such a partnership would ultimately challenge Chinese legitimacy, since making excessive claims under international law is a trademark of Beijing’s approach to statecraft.^{vi} Targeting legitimacy matters, because lulling adversaries to believe they are not in conflict with China is at the heart of how Beijing pursues its goals.^{vii} Simply put, China’s approach to statecraft only works if its actions seem legitimate, or at least legitimate enough, under international law. This paper will propose a way to challenge Chinese legitimacy by focusing attention on the illegitimacy of its actions. Regarding IUU fishing, since international law does not recognize China’s Nine-Dash Line, fishing without permission by Chinese vessels in its neighbors’ EEZs is by definition illegal.^{viii}

The United States should reinforce its partnership with the ROI on this issue to challenge the legitimacy of excessive Chinese claims in the SCS.^{ix} This type of partnership makes sense for three reasons. First, the ROI is well-postured to be a regional leader against illegal fishing, given its embrace of its maritime identity. Second, its aggressive stance against IUU fishing makes it an ideal partner for the United States to counter Chinese claims in the SCS. Third, a window of opportunity exists to use IUU fishing as a strategic narrative against China, while the ROI is on the UN Security Council from 2019 to 2020.

Leadership on Illegal Fishing is Key to Maritime Identity

The ROI's embrace of its maritime identity under Jokowi's GMF policy has resulted in greater focus on illegal fishing. In March 2017, President Jokowi released his long-awaited Sea Policy, which elaborated on the maritime vision he announced at the 2014 East Asia Summit.^x The policy expanded on the original five pillars by adding two additional ones and providing a framework for implementation.^{xi} Of particular note, one of the manifestations of the GMF initiative has been the country's clamp down on IUU fishing.^{xii} This trend likely will continue as the Jokowi administration further implements its maritime vision under the more comprehensive Sea Policy. Since aggressively combatting illegal fishing has been successful, it stands to reason that IUU fishing will gain greater importance as the ROI continues to define its maritime identity.

The ROI's size, geographic location, and desire to control its EEZ also contribute to its standing as a regional leader against IUU fishing. As the world's largest archipelagic nation with the world's fourth largest population, commercial fishing rights are an important strategic issue.^{xiii} In 2016 alone, the United Nations estimated that it generated 14.3 million tons of seafood, making it the second largest seafood producer in the world.^{xiv} It is located on the periphery of China's infamous Nine-Dash Line, and its EEZ around the Natuna islands overlaps China's claim.^{xv} These competing claims over the waters around the Natuna islands directly relate to illegal fishing, since an essential aspect of EEZs is the protection of resources. The ROI's archipelagic nature, dependency on fishing, and need to secure its fishing rights all support the country becoming an influential leader on IUU fishing.

Critics may argue that the ROI is not well-positioned to be a regional leader on combatting illegal fishing for two important reasons. First, even though its EEZ around the Natuna islands overlaps with China's claim, it considers itself a non-claimant in SCS disputes.^{xvi} Second, taking a regional lead against IUU fishing could antagonize China, and potentially jeopardize Chinese investments in Indonesian infrastructure. Estimates project that the ROI's cash-strapped government needs anywhere from \$157 billion to upwards of \$500 billion to fund its infrastructure initiatives, with China as a potential source for at least some of those funds.^{xvii} To the first point, regardless of Jakarta's official diplomatic position on the SCS, it stands to lose if China successfully codifies its Nine-Dash Line. Furthermore, the ROI's tack into the winds of maritime relevance almost certainly puts it on a collision course with China.^{xviii} To the second point, while China is the third-largest foreign investor in the country with \$3.36 billion in 2017, this does not mean it wants to be a client of China.^{xix} The Jokowi administration should assume that there are strings attached to Chinese infrastructure investments; using foreign aid as leverage is a common Chinese ploy.^{xx} However, the ROI ultimately has the final say regarding how deeply it allows China to involve itself in Indonesian affairs. Given Jokowi's focus on Indonesian sovereignty, it seems unlikely that Jakarta would allow Beijing to gain too much leverage.

As strong as these counterpoints are, it is unlikely that the ROI would acquiesce to China on a fundamental issue of sovereignty such as fishing rights, given the importance of the fishing industry to the country. Additionally, combating IUU fishing has emerged as a key element of both President Jokowi's GMF and his more comprehensive Sea Policy. Trading access to fishing rights for money would be politically risky for Jokowi, especially since he is up for reelection in 2019. For now, the ROI seems to have chosen a middle road between pursuing regional leadership on illegal fishing and remaining neutral towards China. However, this position could easily change if China continues its ascendancy and the ROI were to feel isolated. For this reason, a closer relationship with the United States on illegal fishing may be attractive.

Want an Aggressive Partner? Find a Common Issue

The ROI's aggressive stance against IUU fishing and its demonstrated willingness to take action make it an ideal partner for the United States to counter excessive Chinese claims. Its efforts to protect its maritime resources have resulted in an overall reduction of IUU fishing nationwide, including a reduction in illegal Chinese fishing in the North Natuna Sea. Under the leadership of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, the task force President Jokowi established in 2016 to curb illegal fishing has captured and destroyed hundreds of fishing vessels.^{xxi} Later that same year, the ROI and China engaged in three maritime skirmishes over fishing rights around the Natuna islands. New York Times correspondent Joe Cochrane points out that its pushback against China's claims around the Natuna Islands takes direct aim at Beijing's Nine-Dash Line and adds yet another player to the high-stakes competition for maritime rights in the SCS.^{xxii} In addition to its enforcement actions, the ROI also increased its military presence on the Natuna archipelago and renamed the waters around the islands the North Natuna Sea.^{xxiii} China responded to these actions by publicly claiming for the first time that its Nine-Dash Line included fishing waters inside the ROI's EEZ.^{xxiv} Although tensions over fishing rights in the North Natuna Sea have not derailed Indonesian–Chinese relations, they have complicated them. Jakarta's actions to protect its sovereign rights demonstrate that it does not desire subservience to Beijing. These actions also show that Jokowi's GMF is more than just rhetoric. Particularly with regard to IUU fishing, the ROI has shown a willingness to take a proactive role in protecting its maritime resources. The issue is also one on which it and the United States can find common ground.

The illegal fishing issue fits with the Trump administration's views on Chinese actions in the SCS. In his National Security Strategy, President Trump highlighted China's use of non-military methods of statecraft to advance its aims.^{xxv} The administration prioritizes a vision for the Indo-Pacific in which all nations are potential partners against forces attempting to subvert sovereignty.^{xxvi} In keeping with its renewed emphasis on the region, the administration also has scheduled regular freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the SCS, a major change from the Obama administration that infrequently used FONOPS.^{xxvii} The Trump administration's emphasis on sovereignty aligns well with the Jokowi administration's focus on IUU fishing, since the issue is fundamentally one of sovereignty.^{xxviii} The United States' intention to increase

FONOPS in the region is further evidence of its renewed commitment to challenge aggressive Chinese statecraft in the Indo-Pacific. However, increased naval operations alone have been ineffective, since “gray-zone aggressors deliberately refuse to breach the threshold between uneasy peace and armed conflict.”^{xxix} This aspect of gray-zone conflict suggests the need for a more creative approach. A reinforced US–ROI partnership to combat IUU fishing is one option that would bridge the gap between inaction and military escalation.

Aligning national interests may prove to be easy, since an effective US-ROI partnership aimed at China’s excessive claims could build on the diplomatic framework already in place to reduce IUU fishing. The two nations already work together to implement the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Agreement on Port State Measures, which focuses on eliminating IUU fishing.^{xxx} The partnership focuses on a number of interagency programs coordinated by the US Embassy in Jakarta.^{xxxi} The FAO agreement has been a good framework for US–ROI cooperation on IUU fishing, but it could serve a broader purpose. Both nations could use the agreement to more closely link China to illegal fishing. This connection would be easy to make for two reasons: 1) As a non-party to the agreement, China is vulnerable to charges that it is working against the international community when it comes to stopping illegal fishing, and 2) China’s Nine-Dash Line essentially enables illegal fishing by Chinese vessels in its neighbors’ EEZs.

The July 2016 ruling by the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration against China in its dispute with the Philippines provides legal clarity on China’s Nine-Dash Line. The ruling only strengthens the connection between IUU fishing and broader EEZ disputes in the SCS. This link further calls into question the legitimacy of Beijing’s claims and provides a rationale for the United States and the ROI to characterize Chinese encroachments into its neighbors’ EEZs as crimes. In fact, this is exactly how it has treated incursions by foreign illegal fishing vessels into its EEZ under the Jokowi administration.^{xxxii} Treating these incursions as crimes is a brilliant move by Jakarta, since it is a logical way to interpret Chinese actions through the lens of the 2016 ruling. Considering illegal fishing a crime undercuts China’s sovereignty argument, since viewing the issue as a criminal matter presumes that the SCS disputes are settled international law. Approaching the connection between illegal fishing and EEZs as a law enforcement issue complicates matters for China and allows the United States to reinforce its partnership with Indonesia without being explicitly anti-Chinese.

A fair critique of this argument is that despite the ROI’s aggressive actions against IUU fishing, a reinforced US–ROI partnership on the issue will have little impact on Chinese actions. To paraphrase Feng Zhang from Australian National University, the paradoxical effect of the UN Arbitration Court ruling is that although Beijing has hardened its stance on the Nine-Dash Line, it also seems more willing to negotiate.^{xxxiii} While China is not yet ready to give up on its Nine-Dash Line, Beijing is not ready to go to war over it. As Michael Mazzar argues, China is aware of the advantages of being seen as a responsible global actor.^{xxxiv} This presumably is why China

continues to aggressively pursue its gray-zone strategies as opposed to military escalation or foregoing the Nine-Dash Line. Although China has chosen to continue pursuing its excessive claims since the court ruling, “[i]n terms of international law, the arbitration award was a humiliating defeat for Beijing.”^{xxxv} Herein lies the strength of a US–ROI partnership centered on illegal fishing. By emphasizing the connection between illegal fishing and EEZ disputes, the two nations could steer the narrative away from international law to one that also includes a more compelling story about illegal fishing. The attention the Jokowi administration has received regarding its approach to the issue should be a good indicator of the potential strength of illegal fishing as a strategic narrative. More to the point, the UN’s court ruling grabbed China’s attention. An additional challenge to its legitimacy, by connecting China to illegal activities such as IUU fishing, would be difficult for Beijing to ignore.

The Strategic Narrative of Illegal Fishing

A strategic narrative drawing the connection between Chinese statecraft through intimidation, EEZ disputes, and IUU fishing would further complicate matters for Beijing. Two aspects of a strategic narrative that could resonate with an international audience are 1) the nexus between transnational crime, human rights abuses, and IUU fishing, and 2) the environmental impact of the practice.^{xxxvi} Both are potentially useful themes for the United States. With regard to transnational crime, in 2015 the Associated Press reported on fishermen from Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos who were essentially slave labor for the illegal fishing industry in Benjina, Maluku, ROI.^{xxxvii} The Indonesian government immediately cracked down on the operation and evacuated 300 of the fishermen to safety.^{xxxviii} The incident prompted Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti to comment, “One of the reasons I prioritize the eradication of illegal fishing is not only because we are losing trillions of rupiah due to illegal fishing, but also because illegal fishing is often a vehicle for other crimes, such as people smuggling, drug smuggling, and slavery.”^{xxxix}

Minister Pudjiastuti’s comments highlight the country’s credibility on the illegal fishing issue, which could be used to discuss the criminal aspect of IUU fishing from a global platform. In 2018, as the ROI continued to aggressively fight illegal fishing, it also secured 144 of 190 country votes to gain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council from 2019 to 2020.^{xl} Although it did not articulate maritime security as one of four priorities for its tenure on the Security Council, in 2017 Minister Pudjiastuti did call for the United Nations to designate IUU fishing a transnational crime.^{xli} Given Minister Pudjiastuti’s interest in illegal fishing, President Jokowi’s overall emphasis on maritime security, and the emergence of the administration’s fight against IUU fishing as one of its most visible success stories, Indonesia seems well-postured to use its seat on the Security Council to advocate against the practice. If a strategic narrative about illegal fishing is to have any credibility on the world stage, the United States must have a strong partner in the region willing to tell the story. The ROI is potentially that partner.

Messaging the environmental impact of illegal fishing would be equally problematic for China. According to the world's largest conservation non-governmental organization, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), "more than 30 percent of the world's fisheries have been pushed beyond their biological limits and are in need of strict management plans to restore them."^{xlii} The WWF further points out that 85% of fishing stocks are at risk from IUU fishing, and that the practice is a major contributor to overfishing.^{xliii} Highlighting these reports illustrates that illegal fishing already has international attention and an audience. Connecting IUU fishing, transnational crime, and overfishing in the SCS to China is both a compelling story to tell and a difficult one for China to refute.

Some may argue that even if illegal fishing makes for a compelling story, it would not be an effective strategic narrative against China. Considering China's increased economic power and the ROI's reliance on Chinese money to fund infrastructure projects, it might be difficult to convince the country to support Security Council measures that could alienate Beijing. Although this argument is not insignificant and suggests that there is little incentive for Indonesia to support what essentially sounds like a "feel-good" initiative with the United States, how the story is crafted is what matters. Ironically, while this paper has spent a great deal of effort drawing linkages between China and illegal fishing, framing this illegal fishing narrative need not be so direct. An effective strategic narrative should be informed by common interests between the United States and the ROI, such as the criminal aspect of illegal fishing. This would enable the two nations to use IUU fishing as leverage against China on the Security Council, without forcing either into an openly anti-China position.

In order to ensure Indonesian buy-in to this narrative, the United States should emphasize human rights, environmental, and economic impacts of the practice. These impacts are not explicitly anti-China, thus avoiding direct conflict, and align with Indonesia's stance on IUU fishing. They also potentially place China on the horns of a dilemma. By introducing a measure to the Security Council that designates illegal fishing a transnational crime, China would be forced to choose between two bad options. If it chose to vote for the measure, China would draw attention to illegal fishing by its vessels in its neighbors' EEZs. If China chose either to veto the measure or abstain, then it essentially would be supporting criminal activity. As a single issue, China might be willing to take that risk; however, context matters. Beijing's actions seem much less reasonable when measured against data points such as China's unwillingness to join the Agreement on Port State Measures, its encroachments into its neighbors' EEZs, the 2016 United Nations' court ruling, and its proclivity to use statecraft to bully its neighbors. Simply put, if China opposes international efforts to stop illegal fishing, it will invite greater criticism of the legitimacy of its actions.

Conclusion

Unifying a partnership around illegal fishing would benefit the United States and Indonesia because of the dilemma it would create for China. The more the United States uses the

international system it built to consider, discuss, and encourage rules against practices such as IUU fishing that China is a party to, the more China's legitimacy will be called into question. Although effective, China's aggressive statecraft is not ironclad, especially when it comes to its legitimacy. China might want regional hegemony in Asia; however, Beijing's actions are constrained by the fact that it has "no desire to collapse global economic institutions or create spiraling regional instability."^{xliv} China scholar Peter Dutton sums it up best with his observation that Beijing has turned state coercion upside down by adding rungs to the bottom of the escalation ladder rather than to the top of it.^{xlv} To implement its strategy, China has chosen non-kinetic means and methods to achieve its objectives. To counter this approach, the United States must use the international system to call out China's behavior as unacceptable. The United States should focus on issues such as illegal fishing, which are easily understood by large international audiences and call into question Beijing's adherence to international law.

A reinforced US-ROI partnership on IUU fishing could result in China feeling further isolated from the very international community in which it desires to be a leader. This feeling of isolation could compel China to change its behavior. What is certain is that Beijing's statecraft will not change if the United States, its allies, and its partners do nothing.^{xlvi} Illegal fishing may not be a silver bullet, but the issue is important since it affects all countries in the region. If the ROI emerges as an effective leader on the issue, other countries in the region may consider following its lead. With that said, an important question is to what extent is the ROI willing to challenge China? Jakarta has demonstrated some willingness to draw redlines and push back against Beijing when its EEZ is threatened, as illustrated in maritime engagements with Chinese fishing boats in the Natuna Sea. However, it appears to be reticent to take a leading role globally on illegal fishing, as demonstrated by maritime issues appearing nowhere on its list of priorities for the Security Council. Nevertheless, if the United States actively supports the ROI in its efforts to implement the GMF and joins it to advocate for the elimination of IUU fishing, then it stands to gain two strategic advantages: 1) A strong regional partner, and 2) A strong strategic narrative to challenge the legitimacy of Chinese claims in the SCS.

Recommendations

The United States and the ROI should introduce a measure to the UN Security Council to designate IUU fishing a transnational crime. The Agreement on Port State Measures has had some effect in reducing IUU fishing; a measure designating illegal fishing as a transnational crime would only strengthen that framework. The United States also must emphasize that the elimination of IUU fishing is a strategic priority in the Indo-Pacific region, and that it fully supports Indonesian leadership on the issue. The measure should include two key aspects: 1) Nations must respect the rights of their neighbors to police their EEZs, and 2) Nations must provide information to an international maritime law enforcement database to track known or suspected illegal fishing vessels. To be effective, the measure must put China in a position to either come out in favor of eliminating illegal fishing, or argue why illegal fishing is an acceptable practice. Either way, China would be forced to take a disadvantageous position.

In addition to a UN Security Council measure, the United States also should support its diplomatic efforts in Jakarta with military resources from the US Indo-Pacific Command when appropriate. A joint diplomatic–military approach enhances unity of effort and brings additional resources to bear such as special operations forces (SOF), which would be well-suited to support the embassy’s mission. Specifically, inherent to SOF are several skillsets and interagency networks that would strengthen a reinforced US-ROI partnership on IUU fishing and complement existing US counterterrorism relationships with the country. Two SOF resources that could be useful and are worthy of further research are military information support operations assets and counterterrorism information-sharing relationships. These capabilities could prove essential to both developing and effectively communicating a strong IUU fishing strategic narrative and tracking Chinese illegal fishing vessels.

Finally, the United States should recognize the present state of affairs in the SCS as a conflict that is defined by daily competition for influence and legitimacy. At present, it appears that Beijing has the wind at its back. However, the international system remains tilted in Washington’s favor. The United States must view the ROI’s non-permanent seat on the Security Council and willingness to take a leadership role on issues such as IUU fishing as opportunities to reassert influence in the SCS. This window of opportunity will not remain open forever. In fact, it is rapidly closing relative to the time required for diplomatic action and the expiration of ROI’s time on the Security Council. Put simply, the time to act is now.

ⁱ Rory Metcalf, “Jokowi’s maritime inaugural address,” *The Interpreter* (October 21, 2014), accessed October 20, 2018, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/jokowis-maritime-inaugural-address>.

ⁱⁱ Rendi A. Witular, “Jokowi Launches Maritime Doctrine to the World,” *The Jakarta Post* (November 13, 2014), accessed August 30, 2018, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/13/jokowi-launches-maritime-doctrine-world.html>.

ⁱⁱⁱ The five pillars of the Jokowi administration’s Global Maritime Fulcrum are as follows: 1) Reviving Indonesia’s maritime culture, 2) Improving maintenance and management of marine resources, 3) Improving maritime infrastructure and connectivity, 4) Committing to resolving regional maritime conflicts through diplomacy, and 5) Building Indonesia’s maritime defense capacity. Adelle Neary, “Jokowi Spells Out Vision for Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Nexus,’” *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (November 26, 2014), accessed August 30, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/jokowi-spells-out-vision-indonesia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cglobal-maritime-nexus%E2%80%9D>.

^{iv} California Environmental Associates, “Trends in Marine Resources and Fisheries Management in Indonesia,” *California Environmental Associates Review* (2018), accessed July 28, 2018, <https://www.packard.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Indonesia-Marine-Full-Report-08.07.2018.pdf>.

^v The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations Agreement on Port State Measures has 56 party nations and focuses on eliminating IUU fishing. It will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

^{vi} This paper uses “statecraft” as a shorthand to describe either the individual or integrated use of instruments of national power in state competition other than armed conflict in order to achieve political aims. As the term statecraft relates to “gray zone strategies,” there is no common definition of what constitutes a “gray zone.” In the context of this paper, Chinese statecraft is synonymous with the vaguer term “gray zone strategies.” It is also worth noting that this paper borrows from the United States’ joint military definition of legitimacy, which describes it as “actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of...actions from the various perspectives of interested

audiences.” Joint Staff, “Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Appendix A-4,” (January 17, 2017), accessed October 12, 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf.

vii Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), 85.

viii The FAO partly defines IUU fishing as “Fishing and fishing-related activities conducted in contravention of national, regional and international laws.” FAO, “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing,” accessed September 6, 2018, <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6069e.pdf>.

ix “Reinforce” in the context of this paper follows the Joint Staff’s Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning definitions for cooperative relationships. Namely, reinforced relationships are described as follows: “independent actors may already have taken action, of their own accord, that aligns with our interests. In these cases, we seek to support their actions and do not necessarily need to take the lead (though that may change with continual assessment).” Joint Staff, “Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning,” (March 16, 2018), 20, accessed October 12, 2018.

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257.

x Evan Laksmana, “Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum,” *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative* (March 23, 2017), accessed August 30, 2018, <https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-accelerating/>. The Jokowi administration named its policy the “Sea Policy,” also known as Presidential Regulation No. 16, in order to root both its name and the spirit of the policy in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

xi Keoni Marzuki, “Indonesia’s National Sea Policy: Concretising the Global Maritime Fulcrum,” *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies* (March 24, 2017), accessed October 3, 2018, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CO17052.pdf>.

xii Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing,” *The Diplomat* (March 09, 2017), accessed October 4, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/indonesia-wants-global-war-on-illegal-fishing/>.

xiii CIA Factbook, “East & Southeast Asia: Indonesia,” accessed August 30, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>.

xiv Parameswaran, “Indonesia Wants Global War on Illegal Fishing.”

xv Ibid.

xvi Adelle Neary, “Jokowi Spells Out Vision.”

xvii Karlis Salna, “Indonesia Needs \$157 Billion for Infrastructure Plan,” *Bloomberg* (January 25, 2018), accessed August 31, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/indonesia-seeks-to-plug-157-billion-gap-in-nation-building-plan>.

xviii Joe Cochrane, “Indonesia, Long on Sidelines, Starts to Confront China’s Territorial Claims,” *The New York Times* (September 10, 2017), accessed August 31, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/world/asia/indonesia-south-china-sea-military-buildup.html>.

xix Rachmadea Aisyah, “Chinese Investments trending in Indonesia,” *The Jakarta Post* (May 2, 2018), accessed August 31, 2018, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/02/chinese-investments-trending-in-indonesia.html>.

xx The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka is one of the more notorious examples of Chinese predatory lending. In that case, China gave Sri Lanka money, which Beijing knew its poorer neighbor could never repay, to revitalize the port. When Sri Lanka failed to make its payments, China leveraged those debts to coerce Sri Lanka into signing over rights for 99 years to the 15,000 acre port. Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough up a Port,” *The New York Times* (June 25, 2018), accessed October 21, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html>.

xxi Krithika Varagur, “Indonesia is Blowing Illegal Fishing Boats Out of the Water,” *Voice of America News* (June 26 2017), accessed August 31, 2018. <https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-fisheries-protection/3901739.html>. Since Indonesia began its crackdown on illegal fishing, reports on the number of illegal fishing boats destroyed by Jakarta range anywhere from the high 300s to 500 vessels.

xxii Joe Cochrane, “Indonesia, Long on Sidelines.”

xxiii Ibid.

xxiv Ibid.

xxv Trump Presidential Administration, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (December 2017), accessed September 1, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

xxvi Ibid.

^{xxvii} Ankit Panda, “A FONOP Schedule in the South China Sea: What Next,” *The Diplomat* (September 11, 2017), accessed September 1, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/a-fonop-schedule-in-the-south-china-sea-what-next/>.

^{xxviii} Although EEZs are in international waters, according to UNCLOS coastal states have the right to enforce sovereign rights in this zone for economic purposes. United States Navy, *Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M: The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, (Norfolk: Department of the Navy, 2017), 1-9.

^{xxix} James Holmes and Toshi Yoshira, “Five Shades of Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy,” *The National Interest* (May 2, 2017), accessed August 30, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450>.

^{xxx} Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, “Agreement on Port State Measures: Parties to the PMSA,” accessed October 20, 2018, <http://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/background/parties-psma/en/>; Of significant note, China is not one of the 56 nations that are a party to the agreement.

^{xxxi} U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, “Fact Sheet: U.S.– Indonesian Maritime Cooperation,” accessed September 1, 2018, <https://id.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/embassy-fact-sheets/fact-sheet-u-s-indonesia-maritime-cooperation/>. The specific programs of the United States–Indonesia partnership are capacity building, technology procurement, and systems integration.

^{xxxii} David G. Rose, “China calls it fishing, Indonesia calls it crime: Pudjiastuti finds her target for oceans summit,” *This Week in Asia* (October 18, 2018), accessed October 22, 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2169153/china-calls-it-fishing-indonesia-calls-it-crime-pudjiastuti>.

^{xxxiii} Feng Zhang, “Assessing China’s response to the South China Sea arbitration ruling,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (February 28, 2017), accessed September 1, 2018, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2017.1287876?src=recsys>.

^{xxxiv} Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone*, 82.

^{xxxv} Feng Zhang, “Assessing China’s response.”

^{xxxvi} The reason why an illegal fishing strategic narrative would resonate is because people can relate to narratives about food access, restricting food access through coercion and crime, and the negative environmental impacts of overfishing. International law on the other hand, though important, is much more difficult to understand. In simple terms, all people eat; most people like nature; few people practice law; even fewer practice international maritime law. Why not tell a story people will listen to?

^{xxxvii} International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Human trafficking in the fishery sector: the Benjina case,” (as of March 2018), accessed 13 September, 2018, <https://indonesia.iom.int/human-trafficking-fishery-sector-benjina-case> *inta Olabre*.

^{xxxviii} Ibid.

^{xxxix} Ibid.

^{xl} Pandu Utama Manggala, “Indonesia’s Chance to Advocate Maritime Security Issues on the Security Council,” *The Diplomat* (June 13, 2018), accessed September 13, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/indonesias-chance-to-advocate-maritime-security-issues-on-the-security-council/>.

^{xli} Patsy Widakuswara, “Indonesia Urges UN to Declare Fish Theft a Transnational Crime,” *Voice of America News* (June 10, 2017), accessed September 13, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-urges-united-nations-declare-fish-theft-transnational-crime/3895243.html>; Yuni Arisandy, “Indonesia has four priorities in unsc,” *AntaraNews.com* (June 9, 2018), accessed September 26, 2018, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/116100/indonesia-has-four-priorities-in-unsc>;

Indonesia’s four priorities for its tenure on the UNSC are as follows: 1) Global stability through diplomacy, 2) Regional stability through building synergy between Southeast Asian organizations and the UN, 3) Cooperation to fight terrorism, extremism, and radicalism, and 4) Linking peace efforts to sustainable development goals.

^{xlii} World Wildlife Fund, “Overfishing,” accessed September 13, 2018, <https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/overfishing>.

^{xliii} World Wildlife Fund, “More than 85 Percent of Global Fish Stocks are at Significant Risk of Illegal Fishing – WWF Report” (October 29, 2015), accessed September 13, 2018, <https://www.worldwildlife.org/press-releases/more-than-85-percent-of-global-fish-stocks-are-at-significant-risk-of-illegal-fishing-wwf-report>.

^{xliv} Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone*, 81.

^{xlv} Peter A. Dutton, “Conceptualizing China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” Unpublished paper presented at the CMSI Conference on “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” (2-3 May 2017), Newport, RI.

^{xlvi} On the other hand, reinforcing the existing United States–Indonesia partnership on IUU fishing is a relatively low-cost approach that could yield a good return on investment. What makes this approach potentially useful is that it focuses on a partnership that already exists and on an issue that one partner really cares about. As this paper has

discussed, being viewed as a leader on illegal fishing benefits Indonesia both domestically and internationally. For the United States, why not take advantage of that?

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